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1. Introduction 
We introduce a novel indicator of eurozone exit risk based on American Depositary 
Receipts (ADRs). Our measure exploits the exposure of ADR investors to potential losses after 
currency redenomination of the underlying stocks in the course of eurozone exit. This measure 
has the advantage that it does not rely on investors’ awareness of contractual differences (such 
as assumed in the CDS-bond basis approach (Krishnamurthy et al. (2014)). Furthermore, it 
allows accounting for company and country-specific confounding factors thereby improving 
identification. Employing our daily measure, we are – to the best of our knowledge – the first 
to examine how financial and non-financial stocks are exposed to eurozone exit risk and how 
this exposure is determined by company-specific factors. 
ADRs represent ownership of a specific number of underlying shares in the home 
market (in our case, the eurozone countries) on which the ADR is written. The ADR and the 
underlying stocks represent the same ownership rights. The only difference is the currency 
denomination: ADRs trade in the United States and are denominated in U.S. dollars, while 
underlying shares trade on the European market and are denominated in the domestic currency 
– the euro. In the course of eurozone exit, domestic shares would be redenominated into the 
new domestic currency, which would most probably be associated with a large devaluation 
against the U.S. dollar. As investors anticipate this currency risk, eurozone exit risk will be 
priced in ADR returns. ADRs appear to be an ideal laboratory to derive eurozone exit risk as 
the currency redenomination loss associated with eurozone exit is the only systematic risk factor 
that can explain the exchange rate adjusted pricing of ADRs relative to the underlying stock 
(after controlling for company-specific factors and the U.S. dollar/euro exchange rate).  
 Using 143 ADRs from eight eurozone countries for the period 2008-2015, we find 
significantly higher eurozone exit risk for the five crisis countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain) as compared to the relatively stable countries (France, Germany and the 
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Netherlands). Moreover, exit risk of GIIPS countries shows remarkable time series variation, 
while exit risk in stable countries fluctuates much less.  
We find that eurozone exit risk does not significantly affect the stock returns of domestic 
banks. This result suggests that investors expect that the present value of the long run benefits 
(restructuring and recapitalization of the domestic banking sector, higher credit demand) may 
outweigh the (short run) costs of eurozone exit (such as balance sheet losses and a cut-off from 
ECB refinancing). Analyzing cross-border spillovers of eurozone exit risk to other banking 
sectors, we document that Portuguese bank stock returns are adversely affected by Greek exit 
risk and that the Spanish banking sector is affected by Portuguese exit risk. Investigating the 
channels of these cross-country spillovers of exit risk, we find that higher credit risk exposure 
(taken from the 2011 EBA stress test) is associated with a larger exposure to eurozone exit risk.  
Moreover, we analyze the exposure of 333 stocks from different industries (excluding 
financials) to domestic eurozone exit risk. We find that Health Care and Telecommunications 
stocks are significantly negatively affected by eurozone exit risk, while Oil and Gas stocks 
respond positively to eurozone exit risk. Obviously, investors expect gains and losses to be 
unequally distributed among industries. Looking at the cross-sectional differences of euro exit 
risk exposures, we conclude that companies with higher debt to assets ratios are less negatively 
(or even positively) exposed to eurozone exit. This suggests that eurozone exit would benefit 
highly indebted companies by reducing their real debt burden.      
There are a few papers proposing alternative indicators of eurozone exit risk.  
Krishnamurthy et al. (2014) use the credit default swap (CDS) bond basis to derive an indicator 
of redenomination risk. They build on contractual differences between CDS and bonds. For 
Italy, for example, CDS do not cover losses caused by the redenomination from euros into a 
new national currency and thus purely reflect default risk of the underlying bond. Yields of euro 
denominated bonds, on the contrary, reflect default risk and redenomination risk. Sovereign 
bond yields above the CDS premium would thus indicate redenomination risk. For Portugal and 
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Spain, CDS cover losses from both default and redenomination. Consequently, the authors use 
the difference between CDS premiums and the yields from U.S. dollar denominated bonds 
(which are purely driven by default risk). Similarly, De Santis (2015) uses the differences in 
the premiums on euro denominated and U.S. dollar denominated sovereign CDS and interprets 
widening spreads as evidence for larger redenomination risk.    
 We argue that the CDS bond basis approach has some limitations. First, it relies on 
contractual details of CDS, which differ, for example, between Italy on the one hand and Spain 
and Portugal on the other. If investors are not aware of these contractual differences, the pricing 
of CDS may not result in an unbiased measure of eurozone exit risk. Second, during the 
eurozone crisis, CDS became increasingly illiquid for countries such as Greece and Portugal, 
and therefore should not be used to study exit risk in these periods. Moreover, it is not entirely 
clear if claims from bonds or CDS would be redenominated into a new national currency after 
eurozone exit.  
 Our approach is based on ADRs, which are available for all GIIPS countries in the 
eurozone. The same pricing assumptions hold for all ADRs alike and ADRs are sufficiently 
liquid. Moreover, contrary to claims from bonds or CDS, where it is not clear (and may depend 
on contractual details) if currency redenomination occurs after eurozone exit, it is certain that 
domestic stocks would be traded in the new domestic currency and that ADRs would still trade 
in U.S. dollars after eurozone exit. Since investors are most likely aware of currency 
redenomination of the ADRs’ underlying stocks, the pricing of ADRs offers a unique laboratory 
to derive a high frequency indicator of eurozone exit risk. 
Klose and Weigert (2014) use survey data on eurozone exit risk taken from the 
electronic trading platform INTRADE and find that exit risk is priced in sovereign bond prices. 
However, these surveys were only available for a short period of time and may not be 
representative. Kriwoluzky et al. (2015) calibrate a structural small open economy model to 
construct counterfactuals without exit risk expectations for Greece. Though the authors do not 
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propose an empirical indicator of eurozone exit, the present the interesting result that sovereign 
and corporate bond spreads would be significantly lower in a state without exit risk 
expectations. 
Our paper is also related to other strands of the literature analyzing the European debt 
crisis. One strand looks at the drivers of and contagion in sovereign default risk in the eurozone 
(e.g. Aizenman et al. (2013); Ang and Longstaff (2013); Corsetti et al. (2013); Costantini et al. 
(2014); Benzoni et al. (2015)). Other papers focus on the bank-sovereign risk nexus (e.g. 
Acharya et al. (2014); Acharya and Steffen (2015); Popov and van Horen (2015); Bocola 
(2016); Engler and Große Steffen (2016); Gaballo and Zetlin-Jones (2016)). A third strand of 
literature relates to the effects of policy measures implemented during the eurozone crisis, 
especially the (unconventional) monetary policy measures of the ECB (e.g. Krishnamurthy et 
al. (2014); Drechsler et al. (2016); Eser and Schwaab (2016)). Others focus on the real effects 
of the eurozone crisis. For example, Meinen and Roehe (2017) document how investment in 
the eurozone is adversely affected by uncertainty shocks.  
 Our paper is also related to studies investigating the pricing of ADRs during currency 
crises. Several interesting studies document that the returns on U.S. dollar denominated ADRs 
are negatively affected by currency crises as the devaluation of the local currency depresses the 
dollar value of the underlying stock (Bailey et al. (2000); Kim et al. (2000); Bin et al. (2004)).  
Pasquariello (2008) reveals that the outbreak of financial crises is associated with a 
disintegration of the local capital market as the pricing dynamics of ADRs and their underlying 
stocks change. Another interesting strand of the literature shows how capital controls can lead 
to price wedges between ADRs and their underlyings, with underlyings being typically 
overpriced (Melvin (2003); Levy Yeyati et al., (2004); Auguste et al. (2006); Arquette et al. 
(2008); Levy Yeyati et al. (2009)). Several papers use ADRs to derive exchange rate forecasts 
(e.g. Eichler et al. (2009)) and to show that financial fragility measures affect the relative pricing 
of ADRs and their underlyings (Eichler (2011)).  
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The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the methodology and data and 
provides some descriptive evidence. Section 3 analyzes the exposure of the banking sector to 
eurozone exit risk. Section 4 looks at the exit risk exposure of stocks in different industries and 
investigates the channels establishing this risk exposure. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Methodology and Data 
2.1 ADR pricing and eurozone exit risk 
 An American Depositary Receipt (ADR) represents ownership of a specific number of 
underlying shares in the home market on which the ADR is written. While the underlying stock 
is traded on the stock exchange of the respective eurozone country and is denominated in euros, 
the ADR trades in the United States and is denominated in US dollars.  
 Since the ADR provides the same rights to the owner as the underlying stock (e.g. 
dividend claims and voting rights), and the ADR and underlying stock can be converted into 
each other at a fixed conversion ratio, the exchange rate adjusted prices of both stocks should 
be equal (Gagnon and Karolyi (2010)):    
𝑃𝐴𝐷𝑅𝑖,𝑡  =
𝑃𝑈𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡∗𝛾𝑖
𝑆𝑡
 ,              (1) 
with 𝑃𝐴𝐷𝑅𝑖,𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑈𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡  representing the prices of the ADR and its corresponding 
underlying stock, respectively, 𝛾𝑖 a fixed conversion parameter and 𝑆𝑡 the EUR/USD exchange 
rate. 
For a fully credible eurozone membership of the country from where the underlying 
originates, ADR returns are thus governed by the returns of the underlying stock and the 
exchange rate: 
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝐷𝑅 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡
𝑈𝑁𝐷 + 𝛽2𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑗,𝑡
𝑆 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡.           (2) 
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If ADR investors do anticipate some risk that a country may leave the eurozone, ADR 
returns should reflect such risk. The ADR market is an ideal laboratory for testing eurozone 
exit risk. By controlling for the underlying stock and EUR/USD exchange rate returns, we 
capture company or macro risk factors that could affect ADR investors (by influencing the 
value of the underlying stock or the euro) – except for country-specific eurozone exit risk. Any 
unobserved omitted variables that could influence the value of the underlying stock and 
potentially bias the estimations (such as news on financial stability, the health of the firm, or 
the real economy), should be absorbed by the underlying stock returns, which are control 
variables in the regression equation. Any omitted variables that could influence the external 
value of the euro (such as systemic risk in the eurozone, the ECB’s or Fed’s monetary policies, 
capital flight, macroeconomic imbalances), should be absorbed in the EUR/USD returns, which 
are also controlled for in the regressions.  
The currency redenomination and potential price loss of the underlying stock in U.S. 
dollar terms associated with eurozone exit is the only systematic risk factor that affects ADR 
returns (after controlling for underlying stock and EUR/USD exchange rate returns). This is 
because any other company-specific or macroeconomic shock affects the ADR and underlying 
stock in the same way. Currency risk associated with eurozone exit is the only shock that can 
lead to a one-time price drop of the ADR stock (relative to the redenominated underlying stock 
price) of the same company, and is thus the only systematic risk factor that may influence ADR 
returns after controlling for underlying stock returns.  
We aim to identify eurozone exit risk by introducing a country-specific eurozone exit 
incentive indicator into the ADR pricing framework which captures fundamental vulnerabilities 
explaining why a country may leave the eurozone (such as sovereign default risk or fragility in 
the banking sector and in the real economy in the country under consideration). We argue that 
if ADR returns respond to such an indicator, eurozone exit risk is priced in ADR returns and 
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thus ADR investors perceive such risk. On the contrary, if no eurozone exit risk is perceived, 
such a vulnerability indicator would not be priced in ADR returns.        
In order to obtain a single variable that comprises different incentives to leave the 
eurozone, we calculate the first principal component out of three market-based factors: the 10-
year sovereign bond yield spread (relative to Germany),3 the returns of the country’s bank stock 
index, and the intraday volatility of the local stock index. Intraday stock market volatility is 
calculated using five-minute ticks from Thomson Reuters Tick History. Data on bank indices 
are also taken from Thomson Reuters Tick History. Sovereign yield spreads are taken from 
Thomson Reuters Eikon. 
We select these three market-based measures for two reasons. First, these measures are 
available at high frequency and thus can be used in an asset pricing framework of ADRs. 
Second, each of these three indicators captures an economic vulnerability that represents an 
incentive to leave the eurozone. Higher sovereign default risk (as indicated by higher sovereign 
bond spreads) indicates that the domestic government is less able to avert sovereign default 
within the eurozone, and would rather opt to exit the eurozone in order to minimize the real 
value of its public debt. A more fragile banking sector (measured by lower bank stock returns) 
may also be recapitalized and restructured more effectively outside the eurozone. Larger 
economic fragility (as indicated by higher intraday volatility of stock market returns) increases 
the incentive to leave the eurozone and restore the competitiveness of the domestic economy 
through external devaluation (rather than the long-lasting process of internal devaluation). The 
relationship between stock market volatility and real economic activity has been well 
documented in the literature (e.g. Errunza and Hogan (1998); Engle et al. (2013)). 
Since we expect each of these three factors to have a distinct influence on each of the 
countries in our sample, we conduct the PCA for each country separately so that the 
                                                          
3 For Germany, we use CDS with maturity of ten years instead. 
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eigenvectors are able to vary between countries. We obtain the variable euro exit incentive 
(EEI) by multiplying the respective values of each of the three variables considered with the 
corresponding eigenvector derived from the PCA: 
𝐸𝐸𝐼𝑗,𝑡 = 𝜆𝑆𝑀𝑉𝑗 ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝑉𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜆Δ𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑗 ∗ ∆𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜆∆𝑆𝑌𝑆𝑗 ∗ ∆𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑗,𝑡         (3) 
𝑆𝑀𝑉 …  𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑦 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 
∆ 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 …  𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 
∆ 𝑆𝑜𝑣 …  𝑑𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝑜𝑓 10𝑦 𝑠𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑠 𝑣𝑠. 𝐺𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑦 
Table 1 in the appendix shows the resulting eigenvectors and the number of observations 
by country. As a robustness check, we conduct the principal component analysis using a rolling 
window of 500 trading days. We find that the resulting principal components are almost 
perfectly correlated with those resulting from the time-invariant approach, suggesting that the 
relation between returns of the bank index, stock market volatility and changes in the sovereign 
yield spread are fairly stable over time, at least for our sample period from 2008 to 2015. Table 
2 in the appendix shows averages of the time-varying eigenvectors and correlations with the 
principal components obtained through the time-invariant approach by country.4  
In order to derive an indicator of eurozone exit risk based on ADR data, we estimate the 
following equation in a rolling time series regression framework, with an estimation window 
of 60 trading days: 
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝐴𝐷𝑅 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑇 + 𝛽1,𝑖,𝑗,𝑇 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝑈𝑁𝐷 + 𝛽2,𝑖,𝑗,𝑇 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑡
𝑆 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑗,𝑇
𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝐸𝐸𝐼𝑗,𝑡   +  ∑ 𝛽𝑙,𝑖,𝑗,𝑇 ∗ 𝑋𝑙,𝑡
𝐿
𝑙=1 +𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  
                (4) 
                                                          
4 However, there might be certain sub-periods for single countries where the eigenvectors derived from the rolling 
window approach might not have the signs consistent with our interpretation of the eurozone exit incentive 
indicator, i.e. 𝜆𝑆𝑀𝑉𝑗 and 𝜆∆𝑆𝑌𝑆𝑗 are not positive, respectively 𝜆Δ𝐵𝐼𝑗 is not negative. Therefore, we opt against this 
more flexible approach, having shown, however, that the following results would not alter too much using this 
alternative specification.   
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where i is the ADR-underlying stock pair index,  j represents the country in which the 
underlying stock is traded, and T denotes the day for which the respective rolling regressions 
window is estimated. ∑ 𝑋𝑙,𝑡
𝐿
𝑙=1  captures the returns of the S&P 500 and weekday dummies as 
control variables, 𝛼𝑖,𝑇 is the intercept, and 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡the error term. Table 3 in the appendix reports 
the variables and their sources used in equation (4).  
In order to derive an indicator of eurozone exit risk, we compute the semi-partial R² of 
𝐸𝐸𝐼𝑗,𝑡 drawn from the time series regressions in equation (4). The semi-partial R² is defined as 
the share of the total variation in the dependent variable that is explained by the variation in the 
part of the respective explanatory variable that contains additional information, i.e. orthogonal 
to the other explanatory variables.5 The semi-partial R² indicates how much of the variation in 
the ADR returns from countries that might potentially leave the eurozone can be explained by 
the information contained in 𝐸𝐸𝐼𝑗,𝑡 – additional to that already contained in the return of the 
EUR/USD exchange rate and the return of the respective underlying of the ADR. We 
hypothesize that the more probable it is that a specific country exits the eurozone, the more 
important 𝐸𝐸𝐼𝑗,𝑡will be as a pricing factor in ADR returns, as identified by the semi-partial R².  
Our panel consists of 143 ADRs from eight eurozone member countries: France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain over the period January 1st 
2008 to June 30th 2015.6 Table 4 in the appendix lists the ADRs used in the analysis. In order 
to analyze eurozone exit risk, we focus on the GIIPS countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, 
Spain). As a placebo test, we also apply our approach to three relatively stable countries 
(France, Germany and Netherlands) in order to check whether the patterns we observe for the 
crisis countries hold for these countries as well. We do not include ADRs from Austria, Belgium 
                                                          
5 For discussions of the concept of semi-partial correlations, see e.g. Fisher (1924) and Baba et al. (2004) 
6 This ending of our sample period is determined by the closing of the Greek stock market on June 27th 2015. 
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and Finland due to a limited number of ADRs and insufficient trading activity for these 
countries.    
We identify potential pairs of ADRs and underlying stocks using information from the 
ADR databases of JP Morgan and the Bank of New York Mellon, as well as from Thomson 
Reuters DATASTREAM. We consider Level I, II and Level III ADRs and make sure that only 
ADRs with satisfactory liquidity are considered. We keep all ADRs that have at least twenty 
observations per quarter for at least four consecutive quarters and whose mean daily trading 
volume exceeds 1,000. We check for correct matches of ADRs with their respective underlying 
stock by regressing ADR returns on the return of their underlying and the USD/EUR exchange 
rate, making sure that the estimated coefficients are significant. We exclude extreme outliers, 
which we define as observations with an abnormal return of greater than 20 % or lower than 
– 20 %. This yields a sample with a total of 148,844 observations.  
Prices of ADRs and their respective underlyings, as well as the EUR/USD exchange 
rate and the values of the S&P 500 are taken from Thomson Reuters Tick History. In order to 
guarantee the most synchronous match possible between prices, we consider the last value 
available prior to 3:00 pm UTC for each day because at that time the U.S. and all eurozone 
stock markets operate in regular mode. The only exception is for Greece during DST, where we 
use the final prices prior to 2:00 pm UTC as otherwise an overlap of trading hours with the U.S. 
stock markets would not be guaranteed.  
2.2 Descriptive Evidence and Results 
Figure 1 – 8 in the appendix illustrate the evolution of our eurozone exit risk measure, i.e. 
the semi-partial R² of 𝐸𝐸𝐼𝑗,𝑡 estimated within the rolling regressions framework as described in 
section 2.1, over the sample period from January 1st 2008 to June 30th 2015 by country.7  
                                                          
7 For the analysis here and all future calculations, we calculate country-specific eurozone exit risk as the average 
of the semi-partial R² measures obtained from single ADRs from the country under consideration. 
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The eurozone exit risk indicator shows remarkable time series variation for the crisis 
countries. Our indicator for the whole sample reaches its maximum for Greece in September 
2011, when about 11 % of the total variation of ADR returns was explained by Greek exit risk.8 
On the contrary, for Germany only 0.2 % of the variation of ADR returns is explained by 𝐸𝐸𝐼𝑗,𝑡, 
on average. For France and the Netherlands, the absolute size of the indicator is also negligible 
and the time series variation appears to be random. A simple pooled OLS regression approach 
with country dummies reveals that eurozone exit risk is significantly higher for the GIIPS 
countries than for France, Germany and Netherlands (see Table 5 in the appendix). Thus, we 
find evidence for a systematic difference in the pricing of ADRs between crisis and non-crisis 
countries, and attribute this to the presence of significant eurozone exit risk assessed by 
investors for the GIIPS countries. 
3. Exposure to Eurozone Exit Risk in the Banking Sector 
3.1 Evidence from aggregate country bank indices 
In this section, we test whether eurozone exit risk, as identified by our measure extracted 
from the ADR market, is priced in European bank stocks. In Section 3.1, we focus on aggregate 
bank stock indices by country to study the exposure of the domestic banking system to domestic 
eurozone exit risk and to the exit risk of other countries. In Section 3.2, we analyse the 
determinants of the exposure to exit risk at the individual bank level. 
A reasonable expectation would be that eurozone exit by the bank’s home country will 
negatively affect a domestic bank.9 On the one hand, credit and asset losses due to economic 
disruptions may occur. A sovereign default simultaneous with eurozone exit would depress the 
value of sovereign bond holdings. Cheap funding from the ECB would no longer be available. 
On the other hand, eurozone exit may also have positive implications for domestic banks, at 
                                                          
8 Please note that this percentage cannot be directly transformed into the probability that Greece would leave the 
eurozone.  
9 However, effects might differ between domestic banks affected by the exit risk of their home country and 
banks in a third country affected by the exit risk of one of the crisis countries. 
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least in the medium and long term. External devaluation may restore the competitiveness of the 
domestic economy, thereby improving the economic outlook and credit demand. Also, a 
restructuring and recapitalization of weak domestic banks may resolve structural problems in 
the banking sector, thereby restoring trust and the functioning of the interbank market. Since 
the overall effect is not clear, it remains an empirical question to test how financial markets 
judge the exposure of domestic banks to eurozone exit risk.  
When evaluating the exposure to foreign eurozone risk, effects might differ. We expect that 
higher eurozone exit risk of a foreign country should have clear negative effects on domestic 
banks, which would suffer under balance sheet losses caused by the imported asset write-
downs.  
In order to evaluate the exposure of domestic banks to domestic and foreign eurozone exit 
risk, we regress the domestic EUROSTOXX bank stock index returns on the ADR-based 
eurozone exit risk indicators derived in Section 2. Results are displayed in Table 6 and Table 7. 
For each of the GIIPS countries, we estimate a model including domestic eurozone exit risk, 
the exit risk indices of the other four crisis countries, and a battery of control variables.10  
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑗,𝑡
𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘,𝑗,𝑑𝑜𝑚 ∆𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑗,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘,𝑗,𝑚 ∆𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑚,𝑡𝑚≠𝑗 +
∑ 𝛽𝑙,𝑗,𝑡 𝑋𝑙,𝑡 
𝐿
𝑙=1 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡               (5)
   We argue that if we find evidence for the impact of one country’s exit risk on the 
banking sector of another country, this effect might be truly attributed to the exit risk of this 
country after controlling for potential correlations of markets and spillover effects. For each 
country, we run regressions for two samples: the whole sample from January 1st 2008 to June 
                                                          
10 We control for banking sector, sovereign, and economic risks in the country under consideration, the GIIPS 
aggregate, and the eurozone. Control variables include the return of the stock market and the change in the 
sovereign yield spread of the respective country, the return of the EUR/USD exchange rate and the change in 
VSTOXX as proxies for systemic risk of the whole eurozone, as well as the return of EUROSTOXX Bank Index 
and first principal components of the GIIPS countries’ bank indices (return bank GIIPS) and sovereign yield 
spreads (∆ sovereign spread GIIPS). 
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30th 2015 and a subsample from January 1st 2008 to the famous “whatever it takes”-speech by 
Mario Draghi on July 26th 2012. 
We do not find evidence that domestic eurozone exit risk has a significant effect on bank 
stock returns in the GIIPS countries. A possible explanation for this result may be that – 
according to the investors’ assessment – the costs and benefits of domestic eurozone exit may 
balance each other out in the GIIPS countries. While current discussions typically stress the 
negative effects of eurozone exit (short-term asset losses, disruptions in financing), investors 
may also see long-term benefits of leaving the eurozone such as a restructured domestic banking 
system and restored competitiveness of the domestic economy, which may spur credit demand 
and interest rate mark-ups. Overall, financial markets appear to believe that the discounted 
value of the long-term benefits of leaving the eurozone may be as large as the short-term costs 
of euro exit.   
Considering cross-country spillover effects, we find robust evidence that Portuguese bank 
stock returns are adversely affected by Greek exit risk, especially during the subsample period 
January 2008 to July 2012. The same applies to Spanish bank stock returns, which load 
negatively on Portuguese exit risk. Looking at the aggregate EUROSTOXX Bank Index (which 
is dominated by banks from Spain and Italy), we find that Spanish eurozone exit risk 
significantly affected returns.  
These cross-country spillover effects may be explained by an indirect and a direct channel. 
There might be an indirect channel through financial stability. If a country leaves the eurozone, 
one would expect significant short-term turmoil on financial markets with negative impacts on 
the banking system in the whole eurozone, e.g. due to asset losses or the worsening of 
refinancing conditions. We account for such effects by including control variables that proxy 
for pan-eurozone systemic risk such as the EUR/USD-exchange rate, ∆VSTOXX, the return of 
the EUROSTOXX Banks index, as well as the first principal component of the returns of GIIPS 
countries’ individual banking indices and sovereign yield spreads. Therefore, we argue that the 
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effects we detect here should be attributed to the direct channel. Exit risk of one country will 
have an effect on the performance of a bank in another country if this bank has direct exposure 
to the country in question, either in the form of sovereign exposure or private credit exposure. 
Either way, the exit of the respective country would cause balance sheet losses to the bank if 
the exiting country were to introduce a new currency that subsequently devalued sharply against 
the euro.  
The evidence provided in this section indicates a direct channel of eurozone exit risk of one 
country on the stock performance of a bank in another country. Banks in Portugal might be 
affected by Greek exit risk and banks in Spain by Portuguese exit risk because they have a high 
exposure to those countries. In order to test this hypothesis, we look at the performance of 
individual banks dependent on their exposure to the GIIPS countries in the next section. 
3.2 Evidence from individual bank level data  
In this section, we investigate why the exposure to eurozone exit risk differs among 
individual banks. A key finding of the previous section was that – while euro exit risk of the 
domestic country is not priced in domestic bank stocks – euro exit risk of other countries is a 
significant determinant of bank stock performance. A sensible explanation for these cross-
country spillovers of eurozone exit risk are bilateral asset holdings of banks. We would expect 
that banks with higher credit exposure to the crisis countries should be affected more severely 
than banks with little to no credit exposure. In order to test this empirically, we consider all 
listed banks that were subject to the 2011 EU-wide stress test conducted by the European 
Banking Authority (EBA). Our sample includes 53 banks from 19 countries in the EU, 
including non-eurozone banks. Table 8 in the appendix provides an overview together with 
some balance sheet information for these banks.  
We consider “Total Exposure at Default” (EAD) as provided by the EBA Stress Test Results 
2011 with the information code “33021". This includes exposure “for securitisation 
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transactions, counterparty credit risk, sovereigns, guaranteed by sovereigns, public sector 
entities, central banks, equities, etc.” (EBA 2011).11 We scale this exposure variable by dividing 
it by “Total Assets” (information code “30029”).12 
At first glance, descriptive evidence in Table 8 seems to support our hypothesis that exit risk 
significantly affects those banks that have the highest credit exposure. For the three Portuguese 
banks in our sample, credit risk exposure to Greece relative to total assets is about 2.57%, on 
average, whereas it is only about 0.17% for all other banks outside of Greece, Cyprus or 
Portugal. Spanish banks also have a significantly higher credit risk exposure to Portugal than 
all other (excluding Portuguese) banks in our sample: 1.45% vs. 0.14%, on average.      
In order to investigate the relevance of bilateral asset claims (as measured using holdings 
of sovereign bonds and credit claims) to the exposure to eurozone exit risk of the GIIPS 
countries, we conduct a two-step regression approach. In the first step, we run time-series 
regressions for each of the 53 banks in our sample and each of the five GIIPS countries, where 
individual bank stock returns of all banks (excluding banks from country j) are regressed on 
exit risk of country j: 
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡
𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘,𝑖,𝑗 ∆𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑗,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑙,𝑖,𝑡 𝑋𝑙,𝑡 
𝐿
𝑙=1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                            (6) 
where ∑ 𝑋𝑙,𝑡 
𝐿
𝑙=1 represents a set of control variables (∆VSTOXX, return of the respective home 
country stock index, ∆ sovereign yield spread of the respective country, first principal 
component of the returns of GIIPS countries’ bank indices and ∆ of sovereign yield spreads).  
                                                          
11 In a different specification, which we do not report here due to space limitations, we also use Sovereign Exposure 
(Gross Direct Long Positions, information code “34010”), but did not find any significant and robust results. 
12 Total Assets are defined as “Total assets after the effects of mandatory restructuring plans publicly announced 
and fully committed and equity raised and fully committed by 30 April 2011” (EBA 2011). Because the credit risk 
exposure data we use relate to December 31st 2010, we obtain a ratio EAD/Total Assets of greater than 100% for 
Italian credit risk exposure of Unione de Banche Italiane SpA.  
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In the next step, we use the resulting exposures to eurozone exit risk, 𝛽𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘,𝑖,𝑗 , as the 
dependent variable in a cross-sectional framework. As potential determinants of bilateral 
eurozone exit risk exposures, we consider bank-specific variables such as the credit risk 
exposure to the GIIPS countries and other controls such as proxies for size (log assets), risk 
structure (risk-weighted assets to total assets) and capital adequacy (Tier 1 capital to risk-
weighted assets):  
𝛽𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘,𝑖,𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐸𝐴𝐷,𝑗 𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑖𝑗 + ∑ 𝛽𝑙 𝑋𝑙 
𝐿
𝑙=1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗         (7) 
For each of these cross-sectional regressions, we exclude the banks residing in country 
j, whose exit risk we use as the dependent variable to avoid possible issues with endogeneity 
due to the link between banking sector stability and exit risk, as well as to ensure that our results 
are not driven by extreme outliers. For Greece, we also exclude banks from Cyprus due to the 
close financial link between these two countries.  
 The results of the cross-sectional regressions are shown in Table 9 – Table 13. We 
estimate a variety of different specifications, including various control variables in both the first 
and second stage. Due to space limitations, we only report results from selected specifications. 
Specifications (1) – (2) relate to regressions where we do not include any control variables at 
all in the first stage, and specifications (3) – (4) to those regressions where we include all control 
variables.13Again, all models are estimated for the full sample and the subsample ending with 
the “whatever it takes” speech. 
For all GIIPS countries except Italy, we find evidence for a significant effect of the 
bank’s credit risk exposure on its exposure to eurozone exit risk. Stock returns of banks that 
have higher credit risk exposure react more sensitively to exit risk of the respective country, i.e. 
                                                          
13 We consider the same control variables as above: the return of the EUR/USD exchange rate, ∆VSTOXX, return 
of the respective home country stock index, ∆ sovereign yield spread of the respective country, return of 
EUROSTOXX Bank Index, first principal component of the returns of GIIPS countries’ bank indices and of 
∆ sovereign yield spreads. 
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they are more negatively affected if exit risk rises. Effects are particularly strong for the 
subsample from January 2008 to July 2012. Regarding the other bank-specific control variables, 
we find that larger banks are more exposed to eurozone exit risk. For banks’ exposure to 
Portuguese exit risk is stronger for less capitalized banks, i.e. banks with a lower ratio of Tier 
1 Capital/Risk Weighted Assets. 
4. Exposure to Eurozone Exit Risk in the Real Sector 
4.1 Hypothesized company-specific determinants of the exposure to eurozone exit risk  
Eurozone exit would be associated with a number of macroeconomic shocks, including 
devaluation of the new domestic currency, disintegration of domestic capital markets, and 
changes in expected inflation and economic growth. Since these changes in the macroeconomic 
environment will affect the cash flows of companies, the returns on their stocks may be affected 
by exit risk. In the following, we investigate the exposure to eurozone exit risk at the individual 
non-financial company level and study company-specific and sectoral characteristics that may 
determine this exposure.  
Since we are not aware of existing studies investigating the impact of eurozone exit risk 
on the performance of single companies, we cannot lean on existing hypotheses on how 
different companies react to exit risk. Given that the domestic currency would depreciate 
sharply after exiting the eurozone, we lean on the literature investigating the impact of currency 
depreciations on stock performance of individual companies (e.g. Forbes (2002a); Glen 
(2002).14  
We follow Forbes (2002a), who lists six dimensions of company-specific variables that 
determine the impact of a (large) devaluation of the domestic currency on company-specific 
stock performance: output characteristics, foreign exposure, production structure, debt ratios, 
                                                          
14 However, it must be kept in mind that this literature focuses mostly on emerging market economies where the 
drivers of a company’s response to a devaluation of the local currency might be significantly different from those 
in eurozone membership countries. 
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size and profitability. Depreciation of the local currency will give companies producing traded 
goods a relative cost advantage, while this is not the case for companies producing non-traded 
goods. Thus, the performance of companies producing traded goods should improve relative to 
that of companies producing non-traded goods. Second, companies with significant foreign 
sales would be expected to perform better following depreciations. Also, companies with a low 
intensity of capital relative to labor are expected to have better performance after a depreciation 
of the local currency. Forbes (2002a) further argues that devaluation particularly hurts 
companies with higher outstanding debt ratios since foreign debt would appreciate. While 
Forbes (2002a) focuses on emerging market companies with high foreign debt ratios, our 
eurozone sample is largely populated by companies whose funds are typically financed 
domestically. The redenomination of debt after euro exit would thus lead to a devaluation of 
outstanding debt. With regard to company size, Forbes (2002a) argues it is not a priori clear if 
larger companies are expected to be more or less affected by depreciations of the local 
currencies since multiple effects might counteract each other. For example, while larger 
companies are more likely to have access to better financing conditions (also during lending 
contractions) and hedge against currency risk, they are also more likely to borrow heavily in 
foreign currencies and are therefore more exposed to negative balance sheet effects following 
depreciations. Likewise for company profitability, Forbes (2002a) does not state a clear 
hypothesis regarding the sign of the impact of a local currency devaluation since various effects 
might work against each other. 
4.2 Results 
Our sample consists of 333 stocks from Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. We 
include all stocks included in the DATASTREAM sector indices.15 We begin our analysis by 
                                                          
15 For the analysis in this section, we exclude Financials for several reasons. First, we already studied them in 
chapter 3. Second, the theoretical channels through which exit risk affects companies from the real sector might 
be quite different from those of the financial sector as we explained in the previous section. Third, financials might 
act as outliers with regard to certain company-specific factors such as the ratio of total debt to total assets and 
therefore might have a substantial impact on the results of this analysis. 
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looking at the whole sample of stocks from the five GIIPS countries, estimating the following 
panel regressions with company fixed effects and robust standard errors: 
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑠,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 ∆ 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑗,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑙 𝑋𝑙,𝑗,𝑡 
𝐿
𝑙=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑛 𝑍𝑛,𝑡 
𝑁
𝑛=1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑠,𝑡                  (8) 
We regress the stock return of company i from country j and industry s on the change in 
domestic eurozone exit risk, as well as on a set of country-specific control variables (return of 
the domestic stock market and the change in the domestic sovereign yield spread) and a set of 
control variables for the whole eurozone (return of the DATASTREAM EMU sector index of 
the respective industry, the change in VSTOXX and the return of the EUR/USD-exchange rate). 
 As can be seen in Table 14, we do not find a significant impact of domestic eurozone 
exit risk on an individual company’s stock performance if we look at the whole sample of 
companies. This supports our notion stated above that it is not a priori clear whether companies 
will be positively or negatively affected by eurozone exit risk. While the effect might be 
significantly positive for some companies, it might be significantly negative for others, so that 
the aggregate effect becomes insignificant.  
Exposure to eurozone exit risk may be heterogeneous across different industries. 
Therefore, we deepen our analysis in the next step by estimating the same equation as above 
for each panel of stocks within the same industry. We use the FTSE/DJ Industry Classification 
Benchmark (ICB) in order to assign each stock to one of the nine following industries: Basic 
Materials, Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Health Care, Industrials, Oil and Gas, 
Technology, Telecommunications and Utilities. 
 The results are displayed in Table 15 to Table 23. While no exposure to eurozone exit 
risk is detected for six out of the nine industries, we find that Health Care and 
Telecommunications stocks are significantly negatively affected by eurozone exit risk, while 
Oil and Gas stocks are significantly positively affected by increases in eurozone exit risk. 
Companies from the Oil and Gas industry in our sample are quite different to those from the 
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Telecommunications industry with regards to the amount of foreign sales: On average, the 
Foreign Sales to Total Sales ratio equals 55.1% for Oil and Gas companies (the highest value 
across all industries), while it is only 26.93% for companies from the Telecommunications 
industry. Also, 75% of all Oil and Gas companies are classified as primarily producing tradable 
goods following the Forbes (2002b) classification (compared to 47.95% for companies across 
all industries), while this is not the case for a single company from the Telecommunications 
industry. This evidence seems to support our hypotheses stated above. In general, one might 
expect the Oil and Gas industry to be one of the major beneficiaries of a eurozone exit since it 
exports mostly commodities denominated in U.S. dollars, resulting in increased local currency 
revenues after the deprecation of the newly introduced currency following eurozone exit. On 
the other hand, the Telecommunications industry is a key example of an industry with low 
foreign exposure and thus limited potential for economic gains following eurozone exit. Given 
the limited upside of the domestic currency value of cash flows in the Telecommunication 
industry, devaluation of the new domestic currency would lead to a depression of the euro/dollar 
value of the cash flows, which would explain why rising exit risk significantly lowers the 
returns of these stocks. With regards to the Health Care industry, the fact that stocks respond 
significantly negatively to increases in exit risk cannot be explained by its foreign exposure, 
which is about the same magnitude as for all other companies. A potential explanation for the 
negative exposure to euro exit risk may be a disproportionately high reliance on public funding 
in the Health industry. As disruptions in sovereign solvency are likely after eurozone exit, 
companies in the Heath Care industry may also be hit by disruptions in revenues. Of course, it 
might be industry-specific factors other than those we can measure directly via the data at hand 
that explain why companies from the Health Care industry respond negatively to increases in 
eurozone exit risk. 
In the next step, we aim to explain the individual exposures to eurozone exit risk through 
company-specific factors, even after controlling for industry membership. Therefore, we follow 
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a two-step estimation strategy similar to that used for the stocks of European banks in Section 
3.2. In the first step, we regress the return of stock i from country j and sector s on the change 
in the home country’s exit risk together with the same set of control variables stated above 
(return of the home stock market, change in the sovereign yield spread, return of the 
DATASTREAM EMU sector index of the respective industry, change in VSTOXX and the 
return of the EUR/USD-exchange rate). 
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑠,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑗,𝑠 + 𝛽𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘,𝑖,𝑗,𝑠 ∆𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑗,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑙,𝑖,𝑗,𝑠 𝑋𝑙,𝑗,𝑡 
𝐿
𝑙=1
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑛,𝑖,𝑗,𝑠 𝑍𝑛,𝑡 
𝑁
𝑛=1
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑠,𝑡 
    (9) 
By running these time-series regressions for each of the 333 stocks in our sample, we 
obtain one estimate of 𝛽𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘,𝑖,𝑗,𝑠  for each stock. In the next step, we explain the cross-section 
of estimated 𝛽𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘,𝑖,𝑗,𝑠  through a set of company-specific variables using country and 
industry fixed effects: 
𝛽𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘,𝑖,𝑗,𝑠 = 𝜇𝑗 + 𝛾𝑠 + ∑ 𝛽𝑙 𝑋𝑙,𝑖 
𝐿
𝑙=1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑠                     (10) 
We check whether the six variables suggested by Forbes (2002a) have explanatory power for 
the impact of eurozone exit risk on an individual company’s stock performance, even with 
respect to within-industry and within-country heterogeneity. The results are summarized in 
Table 24. Descriptive evidence and sources of the company-specific variables used are 
displayed in Table 25.  
After controlling for country and industry fixed effects, we find that the ratio of total 
debt to total assets is the only variable that can explain why companies respond differently to 
eurozone exit risk. Companies that are more heavily indebted respond less negatively, to 
increased eurozone exit risk of their home country. As the majority of debt in eurozone 
countries is originated under national law, redenomination of the company debt into the new 
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national currency after eurozone exit and the subsequent inflationary environment would 
effectively reduce the debt burden of companies. Highly indebted companies may therefore 
benefit most from eurozone exit.  
5. Conclusion 
We exploit ADR investors’ exposure to currency redenomination losses after eurozone 
exit to derive a novel measure of eurozone exit risk. As a proxy for investors’ mistrust in 
eurozone membership, we look at the fraction of ADR returns that is explained by the variation 
in an indicator capturing the economic incentives to leave the eurozone.  
Using 143 ADRs in the period January 2008 to June 2015, we find that our exit risk 
measure is significantly higher and more volatile for the GIIPS countries than for the non-GIIPS 
countries. Investigating the determinants of the exposure to euro exit risk, we find that banks 
with higher credit risk exposure to the respective country are more adversely affected by its exit 
risk. Next, we look at the impact of eurozone exit risk on the real sector in the GIIPS countries. 
We find that companies from the Health Care and Telecommunications industries respond 
significantly negatively to increases in exit risk, while companies from the Oil and Gas industry 
respond significantly positively. Also, more highly indebted companies tend to respond more 
positively. 
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Appendix: 
Table 1: Resulting eigenvectors from the principal component analysis 
Country 𝝀𝑺𝑴𝑽𝒋  𝝀𝚫𝑩𝒂𝒏𝒌𝒋  𝝀∆𝑺𝒐𝒗𝒋  Observations 
France 0.43 -0.68 0.59 2,034 
Germany16 0.38 -0.68 0.63 1,927 
Greece 0.54 -0.67 0.52 1,945 
Ireland 0.29 -0.69 0.67 1,942 
Italy 0.31 -0.68 0.66 1,981 
Netherlands 0.54 -0.68 0.50 2,023 
Portugal 0.39 -0.69 0.61 2,032 
Spain 0.31 -0.69 0.65 1,994 
 
Table 2: Averages of resulting eigenvectors from the principal component analysis using a rolling window of 500 trading days 
Country ∅ 𝝀𝑺𝑴𝑽𝒋,𝒕 ∅ 𝝀𝚫𝑩𝒂𝒏𝒌𝒋,𝒕 ∅ 𝝀∆𝑺𝒐𝒗𝒋,𝒕 𝝆𝒋17 
France 0.40 -0.68 0.59 0.94 
Germany11 0.42 -0.68 0.56 0.82 
Greece 0.40 -0.49 0.59 0.71 
Ireland 0.21 -0.67 0.65 0.95 
Italy 0.33 -0.67 0.65 0.93 
Netherlands 0.44 -0.68 0.55 0.92 
Portugal 0.41 -0.67 0.61 0.83 
Spain 0.30 -0.68 0.64 0.92 
 
Table 3: Variables used in the first-stage regressions and their sources 
Variable Description Source 
𝒓𝒆𝒕𝒊,𝒋,𝒕
𝑨𝑫𝑹 
Daily log return of American 
Depositary Receipt. 
Thomson Reuters Tick History 
𝒓𝒆𝒕𝒊,𝒋,𝒕
𝑼𝑵𝑫 
Daily log return of the underlying 
stock. 
Thomson Reuters Tick History 
𝒓𝒆𝒕𝒕
𝑺 
Daily log return of the EUR/USD 
exchange rate. 
Thomson Reuters Tick History 
𝑬𝑬𝑰𝒋,𝒕 
Country specific market-based 
measure of eurozone exit incentive. 
Calculated using PCA as described 
in 2.1. 
Own calculation. 
𝒓𝒆𝒕𝒕
𝑺&𝑷 𝟓𝟎𝟎 Daily log return of the S&P 500. Thomson Reuters Tick History 
                                                          
16 Since the sovereign yield spread is zero by definition for Germany, for use data from CDS with ten years maturity 
instead. 
17 Correlation between the principal components resulting from the time-invariant approach used for further 
analysis in the paper and the principal components resulting from a rolling window of 500 trading days. 
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Table 4: ADRs in our sample by country 
Name_ADR  First day Last day 
France    
Air France-KLM SA 1:1  02/11/2008 06/30/2015 
Air Liquide SA 5:1  10/28/2008 06/30/2015 
Airbus Group SAS 4:1  01/03/2014 06/30/2015 
Alcatel-Lucent SA 1:1  01/03/2009 06/30/2015 
Alstom SA 10:1  01/06/2011 06/30/2015 
Arkema SA 1:1  07/07/2010 06/30/2015 
AXA SA 1:1  01/03/2008 06/30/2015 
BNP Paribas SA 2:1  10/28/2008 06/30/2015 
CAP Gemini SA 2:1  10/28/2008 06/30/2015 
Carrefour SA 5:1  01/14/2009 27/05/2011 
CGG SA 1:1  02/06/2013 06/30/2015 
Compagnie de St. Gobain SA 5:1  10/03/2014 06/30/2015 
Crédit Agricole SA 2:1   01/09/2009 06/30/2015 
Danone SA 5:1  05/06/2009 06/30/2015 
Dassault Systèmes SA 1:1  10/28/2008 06/30/2015 
DBV Technologies SA 1:1  10/23/2014 06/30/2015 
Électricité de France SA 5:1  07/01/2009 06/30/2015 
Essilor International SA 2:1  10/28/2008 06/30/2015 
Hermes International 10:1  01/04/2011 06/30/2015 
Ingenico Group 5:1  04/04/2014 06/30/2015 
Ipsen Group 4:1  04/24/2012 06/30/2015 
Kering SA 10:1  04/23/2013 06/30/2015 
L'Oreal SA 5:1  10/28/2008 06/30/2015 
Lafarge SA 4:1   10/28/2008 06/30/2015 
LVMH SE 5:1  10/28/2008 06/30/2015 
Michelin SCA 5:1  01/08/2009 06/30/2015 
Orange SA 1:1  07/02/2013 06/30/2015 
Pernod-Ricard SA 5:1  04/11/2012 06/30/2015 
Publicis Groupe SA 4:1  10/28/2008 06/30/2015 
Renault SA 1:1  01/05/2015 06/30/2015 
Safran SA 1:1  07/01/2011 06/30/2015 
Sanofi SA 2:1  01/03/2008 06/30/2015 
Schneider Electric SA 5:1  01/07/2009 06/30/2015 
SCOR SE 10:1  01/05/2009 06/30/2015 
Société Générale SA 5:1  10/28/2008 06/30/2015 
Sodexo SA 5:1  01/07/2009 06/30/2015 
STMicroelectronics N.V. 1:1  01/03/2008 06/30/2015 
Suez Environnement SA 2:1  01/06/2009 06/30/2015 
Technip SA 4:1  10/28/2008 06/30/2015 
Total SA 1:1  01/03/2008 06/30/2015 
Ubisoft Entertainment SA 5:1  10/01/2013 06/30/2015 
Valeo SA 2:1  10/28/2008 06/30/2015 
Vallourec SA 5:1  10/12/2011 06/30/2015 
Veolia Environnement SA 1:1  01/03/2008 06/30/2015 
Vinci SA 4:1  10/28/2008 06/30/2015 
Vivendi SA 1:1  01/05/2009 06/30/2015 
Germany    
Adidas AG 2:1  10/28/2008 06/30/2015 
AIXTRON SE 1:1  01/03/2008 06/30/2015 
Allianz SE 10:1  10/27/2009 06/30/2015 
BASF SE 1:1  10/28/2008 06/30/2015 
Bayer AG 1:1  10/28/2008 06/30/2015 
BMW AG 3:1  01/05/2009 06/30/2015 
Celesio AG 5:1  01/05/2009 06/26/2013 
Commerzbank AG 1:1  10/28/2008 06/30/2015 
Continental AG 5:1  01/07/2014 06/30/2015 
Daimler AG 1:1  04/04/2011 06/30/2015 
Deutsche Lufthansa AG 1:1  10/28/2008 06/30/2015 
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Table 4 (continued): ADRs in our sample by country 
Deutsche Post AG 1:1  01/05/2010 06/30/2015 
Deutsche Telekom AG 1:1  07/01/2010 06/30/2015 
Deutsche Börse AG 10:1  01/07/2009 06/30/2015 
E.ON SE 1:1  10/28/2008 06/30/2015 
Fresenius Medical Care AG & Co. KGaA 2:1  01/03/2009 06/30/2015 
Fuchs Petrolub SE 4:1  04/01/2014 06/30/2015 
GEA Group AG 1:1  04/04/2012 06/30/2015 
Hannover Rück SE 2:1  10/28/2008 06/30/2015 
HeidelbergCement AG 5:1  01/10/2012 06/30/2015 
Henkel AG & Co. KGaA 1:1  10/28/2008 06/30/2015 
Infineon Technologies AG 1:1  04/27/2009 06/30/2015 
K + S AG 2:1  10/01/2010 06/30/2015 
Linde AG 10:1  04/01/2010 06/30/2015 
MAN SE 10:1  10/08/2009 09/29/2011 
Merck KGaA 3:1  10/29/2008 06/30/2015 
Metro Group 5:1  10/01/2013 06/30/2015 
Munich Re AG 10:1  10/29/2008 06/30/2015 
Porsche AG 10:1  10/07/2009 06/30/2015 
ProSiebenSat.1 Media SE 4:1  07/22/2014 06/30/2015 
Rheinmetall AG 5:1  04/02/2014 06/26/2015 
RWE AG 1:1  10/28/2008 06/30/2015 
Salzgitter AG 10:1  04/07/2010 06/14/2013 
SAP SE 1:1  01/03/2008 06/30/2015 
Siemens AG 1:1  01/03/2008 06/30/2015 
Symrise AG 4:1  01/16/2009 06/30/2015 
Greece    
Alpha Bank AE 4:1  10/30/2008 06/30/2015 
Coca-Cola Hellenic 1:1  01/03/2008 03/28/2013 
Eurobank Ergasias SA 2:1  04/14/2014 06/30/2015 
Hellenic Telecommunications Organization SA 2:1  01/03/2008 06/30/2015 
National Bank of Greece 1:1  01/03/2008 06/30/2015 
Piraeus Bank SA 1:2  01/17/2014 06/30/2015 
Ireland    
Allied Irish Banks plc 1:10  08/29/2011 08/14/2014 
Bank of Ireland plc 1:40  01/03/2008 02/13/2015 
C&C Group plc 1:3  07/02/2012 06/30/2015 
CRH plc 1:1  01/03/2008 06/30/2015 
Ryanair plc 1:5  01/03/2008 06/30/2015 
Smurfit Kappa Group plc 1:2  07/03/2014 06/30/2015 
Italy    
Atlantia S.p.A. 2:1  01/25/2011 06/30/2015 
Danieli S.p.A. 1:1  04/08/2013 06/19/2015 
Enel S.p.A. 1:1  10/28/2008 06/30/2015 
Eni S.p.A. 1:2  01/03/2008 06/30/2015 
Finmeccanica S.p.A. 2:1  04/16/2010 06/30/2015 
GTECH S.p.A. 1:1  10/22/2013 09/18/2014 
Intesa Sanpaola S.p.A. 1:6  10/28/2008 06/30/2015 
Italcementi S.p.A. 1:1  10/28/2008 06/30/2015 
Luxottica S.p.A. 1:1  01/03/2008 06/30/2015 
Mediaset S.p.A. 1:3  10/28/2008 12/30/2010 
Mediolanum S.p.A. 2:1  10/11/2013 06/30/2015 
Saipem S.p.A. 2:1  04/01/2010 12/22/2014 
Telecom Italia S.p.A. 1:10  01/03/2008 06/30/2015 
Terna S.p.A. 1:3  04/08/2013 06/30/2015 
Netherlands    
AEGON NV 1:1  01/03/2008 06/30/2015 
Koninklijke Ahold NV 1:1  10/28/2008 06/30/2015 
Akzo Nobel NV 3:1  10/28/2008 06/30/2015 
Aperam SA 1:1  01/31/2011 06/30/2015 
ArcelorMittal SA 1:1  01/03/2008 06/30/2015 
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Table 4 (continued): ADRs in our sample by country 
ASML Holding NV 1:1  01/03/2008 06/30/2015 
Gemalto NV 2:1  05/06/2013 06/30/2015 
Heineken NV 2:1  01/03/2013 06/30/2015 
ING Groep NV 1:1  01/03/2008 06/30/2015 
Koninklijke Philips NV 1:1  01/03/2008 06/30/2015 
PostNL NV 1:1  01/04/2012 06/30/2015 
Koninklijke DSM NV 4:1  10/28/2008 06/30/2015 
Royal Dutch Shell plc 1:2  01/03/2008 06/30/2015 
Royal KPN NV 1:1  10/28/2008 06/30/2015 
TNT Express NV 1:1  07/07/2011 06/30/2015 
Unilever NV 1:1  01/03/2008 06/30/2015 
Wolters Kluwer NV 1:1  10/28/2008 06/30/2015 
Portugal    
Energias de Portugal SGPS SA 10:1  10/28/2008 06/30/2015 
Galp Energie SGPS SA 2:1  01/05/2015 06/30/2015 
Jerónimo Martins SGPS SA 1:2  07/03/2013 12/19/2014 
Pharol SGPS SA 1:1  01/03/2008 06/30/2015 
Spain    
Abengoa SA 2:1  10/21/2013 06/30/2015 
Amadeus IT Group SA 1:1  04/02/2012 06/30/2015 
Banco Santander SA 1:1  01/03/2008 06/30/2015 
BBVA SA 1:1  01/05/2010 06/30/2015 
Enagás SA 2:1  04/02/2012 06/30/2015 
Gas Natural SDG SA 5:1  01/05/2015 06/30/2015 
Grifols SA 1:1  06/03/2011 06/30/2015 
Iberdrola SA 1:4  10/28/2008 06/30/2015 
Indra Sistemas SA 2:1  04/11/2011 06/30/2015 
Inditex SA 2:1  07/01/2010 06/30/2015 
PRISA SA 1:1  01/04/2011 09/22/2014 
Red Eléctrica de España SA 5:1  10/01/2012 06/30/2015 
Repsol SA 1:1  04/01/2011 06/30/2015 
Telefónica SA 1:1  01/03/2008 06/30/2015 
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Figure 1 - 8: Eurozone exit risk by country 
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Table 5: Results from pooled OLS with country dummies using robust standard errors 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Greece 0.00951*** 
    
0.01010*** 
    
 
(0.000452) 
    
(0.000452) 
    
Ireland 
 
0.00270*** 
   
0.00357*** 
    
  
(0.000184) 
   
(0.000183) 
    
Italy 
  
0.00078*** 
  
0.00168*** 
    
   
(0.000108) 
  
(0.000105) 
    
Portugal 
   
0.00064*** 
 
0.00160*** 
    
    
(0.000154) 
 
(0.000153) 
    
Spain 
    
0.00215*** 0.00295*** 
    
     
(8.66e-05) (8.37e-05) 
    
GIIPS 
     
 0.00354*** 
   
      
 (0.000117) 
   
France 
     
 
 
-0.00080*** 
  
      
 
 
(4.62e-05) 
  
Germany 
     
 
  
-0.00121*** 
 
      
 
  
(4.56e-05) 
 
Netherlands 
     
 
   
-0.00249***       
 
   
(3.61e-05) 
Constant 0.00267*** 0.00294*** 0.00298*** 0.00304*** 0.00288*** 0.00208*** 0.00237*** 0.00332*** 0.00336*** 0.00340***  
(1.96e-05) (2.66e-05) (2.73e-05) (2.69e-05) (2.79e-05) (1.69e-05) (1.74e-05) (3.72e-05) (3.42e-05) (3.07e-05)       
 
    
Observations 167,469 167,469 167,469 167,469 167,469 167,469 167,469 167,469 167,469 167,469 
R² 0.030 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.040 0.016 0.001 0.002 0.006 
Prob > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Results are obtained by regressing the eurozone exit risk measures by ADR on country dummies using robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6: Regressions of the return of selected bank indices. Full sample: 01/01/2008 – 06/30/2015 
  Greece  Ireland Italy  Portugal Spain EUROSTOXX Banks 
∆ Exit risk Greece -0.1072 -0.1888 -0.0503 -0.1858* -0.0237 0.1162  
(0.2333) (0.2265) (0.0646) (0.1030) (0.0703) (0.0926) 
∆ Exit risk Ireland 0.6041 -0.1055 0.0255 0.0427 0.0333 -0.1771  
(0.5629) (0.3413) (0.0950) (0.3218) (0.0797) (0.1221) 
∆ Exit risk Italy 4.4455 0.0639 0.0503 -0.7358 0.2850 -0.0430 
 (5.3941) (0.5551) (0.1759) (0.5121) (0.1787) (0.3115) 
∆ Exit risk Portugal 0.2672 -0.4120 -0.0594 -0.4177 -0.3724** -0.1022  
(0.8875) (0.4450) (0.1533) (0.3450) (0.1759) (0.2371) 
∆ Exit risk Spain -0.4990 0.8677 0.0408 -0.1270 0.0380 -0.5404**  
(0.4775) (0.5801) (0.1211) (0.3622) (0.1638) (0.2350) 
Return stock market 1.7089*** 1.7702*** 1.0752*** 1.4313*** 1.0129*** 0.4284***  
(0.0557) (0.0886) (0.0310) (0.0883) (0.0310) (0.0699) 
∆ Sovereign spread 0.0014 -0.0195 -0.0161*** -0.0054 -0.0040   
(0.0013) (0.0128) (0.0040) (0.0058) (0.0031)  
Return exchange rate -0.0147 0.3269** -0.0008 -0.0295 0.0260 0.0144  
(0.1098) (0.1645) (0.0354) (0.0799) (0.0331) (0.0491) 
∆ VSTOXX 0.0025*** 0.0039*** 0.0010*** 0.0028*** 0.0004** 0.0001  
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
Return EUROSTOXX Banks 0.2473* 0.3679*** 0.1892*** 0.1515*** 0.2223***   
(0.1497) (0.0829) (0.0230) (0.0487) (0.0224)  
Return bank GIIPS -0.0022 -0.0000 0.0008** 0.0018** 0.0008*** 0.0087***  
(0.0016) (0.0010) (0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0003) (0.0006) 
∆ Sovereign spread GIIPS -0.0001 0.0003 0.0004* -0.0019*** 0.0006*** -0.0015***  
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0002) 0.0087*** 
Constant 0.0012 -0.0007 0.0001 -0.0015*** 0.0001 -0.0004  
(0.0018) (0.0008) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
Observations 1,404 1,407 1,408 1,404 1,408 1,413 
R² 0.25 0.56 0.90 0.57 0.92 0.80 
Prob > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Results are obtained by regressing the return of the respective bank indices on the change in eurozone exit risk by country and a set of control variables  
using robust standard errors (as described in eq. (5)). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 7: Regressions of the return of selected bank indices. Subsample: 01/01/2008 – 07/26/2012 
  Greece  Ireland Italy  Portugal Spain EUROSTOXX Banks 
∆ Exit risk Greece -0.0414 -0.2064 -0.0544 -0.1975*** -0.0007 0.1673  
(0.2524) (0.3088) (0.0812) (0.0724) (0.0908) (0.1231) 
∆ Exit risk Ireland 1.5265 -0.0247 0.0201 -0.0622 -0.0095 -0.4691  
(0.9996) (1.0397) (0.3114) (0.6150) (0.2335) (0.4174) 
∆ Exit risk Italy -0.5909 -2.3202 0.6005 1.0241 0.1662 -0.6619 
 (1.1714) (2.8218) (0.6600) (1.1621) (0.6678) (1.3363) 
∆ Exit risk Portugal 1.1179 -0.6772 -0.0239 -0.5320 -0.5018*** -0.2195  
(0.8145) (0.5757) (0.2077) (0.4528) (0.1852) (0.3118) 
∆ Exit risk Spain -0.1953 1.0050 0.0989 -0.0915 -0.0131 -0.6792***  
(0.2611) (0.6428) (0.1287) (0.3017) (0.1781) (0.2598) 
Return stock market 1.6236*** 1.8564*** 1.0379*** 1.0879*** 1.0055*** 0.3096***  
(0.0534) (0.1030) (0.0395) (0.0919) (0.0380) (0.0765) 
∆ Sovereign spread 0.0021* -0.0242 -0.0157*** -0.0009 -0.0044   
(0.0011) (0.0148) (0.0045) (0.0074) (0.0038)  
Return exchange rate 0.0767 0.2903 -0.0357 0.0101 -0.0005 -0.0293  
(0.0871) (0.2363) (0.0478) (0.0870) (0.0457) (0.0674) 
∆ VSTOXX 0.0014*** 0.0042*** 0.0009*** 0.0020*** 0.0004* -0.0000  
(0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0004) 
Return EUROSTOXX Banks 0.0663 0.3791*** 0.1818*** 0.1155** 0.2075*** 0.0103***  
(0.0607) (0.1089) (0.0274) (0.0526) (0.0276) (0.0006) 
Return bank GIIPS -0.0006 -0.0006 0.0013*** 0.0024*** 0.0013*** -0.0015***  
(0.0008) (0.0018) (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0004) (0.0003) 
∆ Sovereign spread GIIPS -0.0007 0.0003 0.0003 -0.0021*** 0.0005** -0.0293  
(0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0002) (0.0674) 
Constant 0.0002 -0.0012 -0.0001 -0.0012* 0.0003 -0.0002  
(0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0004) 
Observations 798 799 800 796 800 801 
R² 0.80 0.58 0.90 0.57 0.92 0.81 
Prob > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Results are obtained by regressing the return of the respective bank indices on the change in eurozone exit risk by country and a set of control variables  
using robust standard errors (as described in eq. (5)).. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 8: List of banks in our sample 
 EBA 
Code 
Total assets 
RWA 
(%) 
Tier 1 
(%) 
EAD (%) 
Bank GR IE IT PT ES 
GIIPS 
Eurobank Ergasias SA gr030 85,885 55.85 8.96 61.72 0.14 0.30 0.08 0.22 
National Bank of Greece SA gr031 118,832 57.48 11.94 58.05 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.00 
Alpha Bank AE gr032 66,798 73.30 10.77 69.12 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 
Piraeus Bank SA gr033 57,680 65.86 8.00 59.61 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 
Agricultural Bank of Greece SA gr034 31,221 40.47 6.27 80.82 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 
TT Hellenic Postbank SA gr035 16,783 39.40 18.50 86.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Allied Irish Banks, plc ie037 131,311 75.22 3.71 0.04 65.43 1.14 0.42 2.31 
Bank of Ireland Group ie038 156,712 53.52 8.39 0.12 43.96 0.57 0.24 1.25 
Intesa Sanpaolo SpA it040 576,962 57.57 7.88 0.16 0.21 72.47 0.27 1.14 
UniCredit SpA it041 929,488 48.94 7.85 0.00 0.00 41.12 0.00 0.00 
Banca Monte dei Paschi de Siena SpA it042 244,279 44.72 5.77 0.00 0.00 84.06 0.00 0.00 
Banco Popolare Sc it043 140,043 67.75 5.77 0.00 0.00 87.53 0.00 0.00 
Unione de Banche Italiane SpA it044 130,559 72.27 6.95 0.00 0.00 102.08 0.00 0.00 
Banco Comercial Portugues SA  pt054 100,010 59.56 5.91 6.33 1.45 0.08 67.96 0.94 
Banco Espirito Santo SA pt055 85,644 83.04 6.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 65.22 8.00 
Banco BPI SA pt056 43,826 59.41 8.19 1.38 0.87 2.73 75.88 8.27 
Banco Santander SA es059 1,223,267 48.58 7.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.66 29.06 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA es060 540,936 57.92 7.96 0.00 0.32 0.11 1.69 70.01 
Bankia SA es061 327,930 61.14 6.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 84.93 
Banco Popular Español SA es064 129,183 73.17 7.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.29 93.65 
Banco de Sabadell SA es065 96,703 58.41 6.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 90.84 
Bankinter SA es069 53,476 57.90 6.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 93.95 
Banca Civica SA es071 71,055 64.87 8.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 93.65 
Caja de Ahorros de Mediterraneo es083 72,034 66.98 3.82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 92.11 
Averages GIIPS  226,276 60.14 7.69 17.66 4.69 16.35 9.24 27.93 
Non GIIPS Eurozone 
Erste Group Bank AG at001 205,938 58.53 8.72 0.46 0.15 1.01 0.12 0.44 
Dexia SA be004 548,135 25.69 12.07 0.91 0.00 9.11 1.03 6.07 
KBC Groep NV be005 276,723 40.45 10.46 0.20 6.59 2.20 0.08 1.05 
Cyprus Popular Bank Public Co. Ltd. cy006 42,580 64.88 7.29 43.88 0.23 1.12 0.51 0.64 
Bank of Cyprus PCL cy007 41,996 62.57 8.12 26.77 0.12 0.64 0.00 0.21 
BNP Paribas SA fr013 1,998,157 30.09 9.21 0.43 0.39 6.98 0.41 1.72 
Crédit Agricole SA fr014 1,503,621 37.35 8.24 1.80 0.45 5.56 0.21 0.99 
Société Générale SA fr016 1,051,323 32.71 8.09 0.63 0.44 1.99 0.12 1.29 
Deutsche Bank AG de017 1,905,630 18.19 8.76 0.19 0.96 2.14 0.22 1.69 
Commerzbank AG de018 771,201 34.69 9.99 0.59 0.01 2.49 0.56 2.52 
Landesbank Berlin Holding AG de027 133,861 26.34 14.64 0.37 0.91 2.58 0.21 2.85 
Bank of Valetta plc mt046 6,382 52.75 10.53 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ING Groep NV nl047 933,073 34.41 9.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SNS Reaal Groep NV nl050 78,918 26.99 8.36 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.67 
Averages Non GIIPS Eurozone  730,089 37.92 9.51 5.86 0.79 2.77 0.27 1.55 
Non Eurozone 
Danske Bank A/S dk008 402,555 36.25 9.99 0.00 3.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Jyske Bank A/S dk009 32,752 43.02 12.06 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sydbank A/S dk010 20,238 48.87 12.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
OTP Bank Nyrt hu036 35,190 76.27 12.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
DNB ASA no051 209,954 56.10 8.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
PKO Bank Polski SA pl052 35,540 100.0 11.82 0.00 0.1 0.24 0.00 0.00 
Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor dd si058 0 - 7.40 - - - - - 
Nordea Bank AB se084 542,853 39.56 8.90 0.04 0.17 0.05 0.01 0.09 
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB se085 212,240 40.82 11.09 0.03 0.20 0.08 0.03 0.38 
Svenska Handelsbanken AB se086 240,202 44.28 7.72 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Swedbank AB se087 191,365 44.08 8.72 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc gb088 607,351 100.0 9.71 0.58 10.58 1.74 0.28 3.84 
HSBC Holdings plc gb089 1,783,199 46.30 10.53 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.54 
Barclays plc gb090 1,725,709 26.72 10.03 0.01 0.24 1.52 0.73 2.55 
Lloyds Banking Group plc gb091 1,006,082 46.93 10.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Averages Non Eurozone  432,793 53.55 10.13 0.07 0.94 0.33 0.07 0.52 
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Table 9: Determinants of banks’ exposure to Greece exit risk 
𝐄𝐱𝐢𝐭 𝐑𝐢𝐬𝐤𝐆𝐫𝐞𝐞𝐜𝐞 Full Sample Subsample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Credit Exposure/Assets -4.317*** -3.916** -3.441*** -3.219** -4.646*** -4.187** -5.120*** -4.542***  
(1.213) (1.783) (0.936) (1.467) (1.389) (1.706) (0.983) (1.383) 
Log(Total Assets)  -0.0552*  -0.0238  -0.0490  -0.0203  
 (0.0276)  (0.0262)  (0.0311)  (0.0312) 
RWA/Total Assets  -0.204  -0.214  0.00700  0.0270 
  (0.223)  (0.200)  (0.225)  (0.146) 
Tier 1/RWA  1.591  0.983  2.108  2.488 
  (3.713)  (3.075)  (3.821)  (2.921) 
Constant -0.118*** 0.530 0.0236 0.342 -0.101** 0.319 0.0559 0.0774  
(0.0432) (0.406) (0.0354) (0.379) (0.0434) (0.428) (0.0354) (0.403) 
Observations 44 44 44 44 43 43 43 43 
R² 0.024 0.112 0.023 0.072 0.028 0.113 0.050 0.121 
Prob > F 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Table 10: Determinants of banks’ exposure to Irish exit risk 
𝐄𝐱𝐢𝐭 𝐑𝐢𝐬𝐤𝐈𝐫𝐞𝐥𝐚𝐧𝐝 Full Sample Subsample  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Credit Exposure/Assets -3.435*** -2.234* -0.935 -0.232 -5.030*** -3.679 -5.567** -5.975  
(1.026) (1.282) (1.202) (1.915) (1.637) (2.848) (2.465) (4.151) 
Log(Total Assets)  -0.0671**  -0.0109  -0.116**  -0.0237  
 (0.0321)  (0.0619)  (0.0524)  (0.0812) 
RWA/Total Assets  0.121  -0.267  0.302  0.161 
  (0.239)  (0.517)  (0.421)  (0.710) 
Tier 1/RWA  -4.401  -0.192  -4.023  2.722 
  (3.145)  (4.504)  (3.788)  (4.722) 
Constant -0.162*** 0.979** 0.0143 0.299 -0.422*** 1.188 -0.0647 -0.0992  
(0.0603) (0.454) (0.0706) (1.137) (0.0793) (0.864) (0.0943) (1.476) 
Observations 50 50 50 50 48 48 48 48 
R² 0.023 0.155 0.001 0.009 0.031 0.203 0.028 0.046 
Prob > F 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.76 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.31 
Results are obtained by regressing the bank-specific estimates of 𝛽𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘,𝑖,𝑗 (as obtained from eq. (6)) on credit exposure of the respective  
bank to the respective country and a set of control variables using robust standard errors (as described in eq. (7)). Banks from country j are  
excluded for this analysis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 11: Determinants of banks’ exposure to Italian exit risk 
 𝐄𝐱𝐢𝐭 𝐑𝐢𝐬𝒌𝑰𝒕𝒂𝒍𝒚 Full Sample Subsample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Credit Exposure/Assets 8.848 -3.746 8.819 -1.440 15.79 -3.980 17.51 1.024  
(13.15) (10.96) (13.04) (10.92) (18.95) (17.99) (17.58) (15.77) 
Log(Total Assets)  0.120  0.0711  0.313  0.449*  
 (0.160)  (0.151)  (0.254)  (0.236) 
RWA/Total Assets  -1.878  -1.317  -2.641  -0.0231 
  (1.270)  (1.110)  (2.291)  (1.993) 
Tier 1/RWA  11.13  17.79*  6.368  14.00 
  (9.593)  (9.207)  (13.74)  (12.79) 
Constant -0.763* -2.124 -0.299 -1.993 -0.650 -3.476 0.397 -6.139*  
(0.393) (2.657) (0.413) (2.426) (0.558) (3.999) (0.593) (3.218) 
Observations 47 47 47 47 45 45 45 45 
R² 0.006 0.060 0.005 0.063 0.010 0.062 0.011 0.051 
Prob > F 0.51 0.47 0.50 0.39 0.41 0.49 0.33 0.22 
Table 12: Determinants of banks’ exposure to Portuguese exit risk 
 𝐄𝐱𝐢𝐭 𝐑𝐢𝐬𝒌𝑷𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒖𝒈𝒂𝒍 Full Sample Subsample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Credit Exposure/Assets -7.347* -2.304 -3.684 0.125 -12.20*** -5.841 -9.923*** -4.481  
(3.674) (3.469) (3.597) (3.812) (3.825) (4.212) (3.675) (4.264) 
Log(Total Assets)  -0.104**  -0.0513  -0.128**  -0.0782  
 (0.0485)  (0.0611)  (0.0597)  (0.0687) 
RWA/Total Assets  -0.574  -0.315  -0.824  -0.810 
  (0.372)  (0.501)  (0.612)  (0.665) 
Tier 1/RWA  5.384**  6.207**  6.601**  6.825* 
  (2.309)  (2.748)  (3.155)  (3.589) 
Constant -0.369*** 0.693 0.0601 0.274 -0.337*** 1.027 0.105 0.840  
(0.0841) (0.777) (0.0904) (1.045) (0.110) (1.001) (0.109) (1.173) 
Observations 49 49 49 49 47 47 47 47 
R² 0.020 0.190 0.004 0.118 0.035 0.208 0.024 0.175 
Prob > F 0.05 0.00 0.31 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Results are obtained by regressing the bank-specific estimates of 𝛽𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘,𝑖,𝑗 (as obtained from eq. (6)) on credit exposure of the respective  
bank to the respective country and a set of control variables using robust standard errors (as described in eq. (7)). Banks from country j are  
excluded for this analysis.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 13: Determinants of banks’ exposure to Spanish exit risk 
 𝐄𝐱𝐢𝐭 𝐑𝐢𝐬𝒌𝑺𝒑𝒂𝒊𝒏 Full Sample Subsample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Credit Exposure/Assets -5.459* -4.584 -5.102** -4.731* -3.968 -2.371 -3.709 -2.863  
(2.803) (3.474) (2.269) (2.429) (3.466) (3.960) (3.104) (2.980) 
Log(Total Assets)  -0.00377  0.00983  -0.00444  -2.59e-05  
 (0.0427)  (0.0359)  (0.0423)  (0.0359) 
RWA/Total Assets  -0.708*  -0.436  -1.249***  -0.759* 
  (0.361)  (0.336)  (0.410)  (0.415) 
Tier 1/RWA  3.695  1.621  3.186  0.757 
  (2.320)  (2.480)  (2.310)  (2.531) 
Constant 0.0479 0.102 0.00360 -0.0475 0.0131 0.376 -0.0401 0.258  
(0.0612) (0.711) (0.0700) (0.615) (0.120) (0.639) (0.0693) (0.605) 
Observations 44 44 44 44 42 42 42 42 
R² 0.078 0.288 0.060 0.125 0.016 0.182 0.033 0.150 
Prob > F 0.06 0.11 0.03 0.01 0.26 0.01 0.24 0.03 
Results are obtained by regressing the bank-specific estimates of 𝛽𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘,𝑖,𝑗 (as obtained from eq. (6)) on credit exposure of the respective  
bank to the respective country and a set of control variables using robust standard errors (as described in eq. (7)). Banks from country j are  
excluded for this analysis.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 14: Results for the panel of individual stock returns:  
 Full sample Subsample 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
∆ Exit Risk -0.029 0.017 0.015 -0.011 0.012 0.010  
(0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) 
Return stock market  0.347*** 0.282***  0.323*** 0.262*** 
  (0.011) (0.011)  (0.011) (0.011) 
∆ Sovereign spread  -0.009*** -0.010***  -0.009*** -0.011*** 
  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) 
Return industry index  0.197*** 0.242***  0.207*** 0.2343***  
 (0.008) (0.011)  (0.008) (0.011) 
∆ VSTOXX   -0.001***   -0.001*** 
   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Return exchange rate   -0.220***   -0.173*** 
   (0.013)   (0.014) 
Constant -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 351,451 334,915 334,433 203,831 188,173 188,874 
Number of stocks 333 333 333 312 312 312 
R² 0.000 0.136 0.140 0.000 0.160 0.164 
Prob > F 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.73 0.00 0.00 
Results are obtained by regressing the return of the respective stock on the change in domestic eurozone exit risk 
and a set of control variables using stock fixed effects and robust standard errors (as described in eq. (8)).  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 15: Results for the panel of individual stock' returns: Basic Materials 
Basic Materials Full sample Subsample 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
∆ Exit Risk 0.011 0.026 0.031 0.054 0.053 0.047 
 (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.076) (0.078) (0.077) 
Return stock market  0.370*** 0.301***  0.350*** 0.275*** 
  (0.032) (0.032)  (0.034) (0.035) 
∆ Sovereign spread  -0.009*** -0.011***  -0.010*** -0.012*** 
  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) 
Return industry index  0.137*** 0.158***  0.147*** 0.158*** 
  (0.020) (0.025)  (0.021) (0.027) 
∆ VSTOXX   -0.001***   -0.001*** 
   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Return exchange rate   -0.166***   -0.127*** 
   (0.036)   (0.038) 
Constant -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 27,754 26,373 26,338 16,882 15,562 15,562 
Number of stocks 28 28 28 28 28 28 
R² 0.000 0.113 0.117 0.000 0.137 0.141 
Prob > F 0.85 0.00 0.00 0.48 0.00 0.00 
 
Table 16: Results for the panel of individual stock returns: Consumer Goods 
Consumer Goods Full sample Subsample 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
∆ Exit Risk 0.012 0.066 0.063 0.065 0.111 0.105  
(0.052) (0.055) (0.056) (0.075) (0.080) (0.081) 
Return stock market  0.314*** 0.240***  0.319*** 0.241*** 
  (0.019) (0.019)  (0.021) (0.021) 
∆ Sovereign spread  -0.006*** -0.007***  -0.006*** -0.007*** 
  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.002) 
Return industry index  0.153*** 0.160***  0.150*** 0.146***  
 (0.014) (0.016)  (0.015) (0.017) 
∆ VSTOXX   -0.001***   -0.001*** 
   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Return exchange rate   -0.127***   -0.067** 
   (0.025)   (0.031) 
Constant -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 57,453 54,809 54,731 32,513 30,035 30,035 
Number of stocks 63 63 63 59 59 59 
R² 0.000 0.087 0.091 0.000 0.104 0.107 
Prob > F 0.82 0.00 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.00 
Results are obtained by regressing the return of the respective stock on the change in domestic eurozone exit risk 
and a set of control variables using stock fixed effects and robust standard errors (as described in eq. (8)).  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 17: Results for the panel of individual stock returns: Consumer Services 
Consumer Services Full sample Subsample 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
∆ Exit Risk 0.003 0.047 0.049 -0.002 0.021 0.027  
(0.061) (0.062) (0.063) (0.103) (0.107) (0.108) 
Return stock market  0.339*** 0.253***  0.300*** 0.237*** 
  (0.030) (0.030)  (0.031) (0.031) 
∆ Sovereign spread  -0.007*** -0.008***  -0.006** -0.008*** 
  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) 
Return industry index  0.230*** 0.356***  0.254*** 0.345***  
 (0.016) (0.026)  (0.017) (0.029) 
∆ VSTOXX   -0.001***   -0.000*** 
   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Return exchange rate   -0.349***   -0.284*** 
   (0.038)   (0.043) 
Constant -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 55,379 52,880 52,794 31,402 29,056 29,056 
Number of stocks 57 57 57 51 51 51 
R² 0.000 0.119 0.125 0.000 0.143 0.148 
Prob > F 0.96 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.00 
 
Table 18: Results for the panel of individual stock returns: Health Care 
Health Care Full sample Subsample 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
∆ Exit Risk -0.331** -0.353** -0.351*** -0.316** -0.381*** -0.388***  
(0.118) (0.117) (0.114) (0.129) (0.125) (0.123) 
Return stock market  0.343*** 0.285***  0.330*** 0.261*** 
  (0.029) (0.028)  (0.033) (0.031) 
∆ Sovereign spread  -0.008** -0.009**  -0.010** -0.011*** 
  (0.004) (0.003)  (0.004) (0.003) 
Return industry index  0.147*** 0.172***  0.158*** 0.157***  
 (0.018) (0.036)  (0.019) (0.033) 
∆ VSTOXX   -0.001***   -0.001*** 
   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Return exchange rate   -0.164**   -0.098 
   (0.062)   (0.061) 
Constant -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 18,175 17,307 17,281 10,654 9,827 9,827 
Number of stocks 14 14 14 14 14 14 
R² 0.001 0.114 0.118 0.001 0.134 0.138 
Prob > F 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 
Results are obtained by regressing the return of the respective stock on the change in domestic eurozone exit risk 
and a set of control variables using stock fixed effects and robust standard errors (as described in eq. (8)).  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 19: Results for the panel of individual stock returns: Industrials 
Industrials Full sample Subsample 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
∆ Exit Risk -0.027 0.023 0.019 -0.011 0.015 0.017  
(0.045) (0.044) (0.044) (0.055) (0.053) (0.053) 
Return stock market  0.315*** 0.249***  0.271*** 0.215*** 
  (0.021) (0.022)  (0.022) (0.022) 
∆ Sovereign spread  -0.012*** -0.013***  -0.012*** -0.015*** 
  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.002) 
Return industry index  0.234*** 0.317***  0.258*** 0.325***  
 (0.014) (0.017)  (0.014) (0.017) 
∆ VSTOXX   -0.000***   -0.000*** 
   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Return exchange rate   -0.297***   -0.276*** 
   (0.021)   (0.022) 
Constant -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 105,369 100,326 100,182 61,441 56,644 56,644 
Number of stocks 99 99 99 91 91 91 
R² 0.000 0.152 0.157 0.000 0.181 0.186 
Prob > F 0.55 0.00 0.00 0.84 0.00 0.00 
 
Table 20: Results for the panel of individual stock returns: Oil and Gas 
Oil and Gas Full sample Subsample 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
∆ Exit Risk 0.117 0.200* 0.197* 0.215*** 0.276*** 0.271***  
(0.103) (0.106) (0.109) (0.068) (0.081) (0.082) 
Return stock market  0.461*** 0.361***  0.403*** 0.305*** 
  (0.068) (0.076)  (0.062) (0.069) 
∆ Sovereign spread  -0.004 -0.006*  -0.005 -0.007* 
  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.004) (0.003) 
Return industry index  0.249*** 0.284***  0.284*** 0.297***  
 (0.047) (0.050)  (0.045) (0.050) 
∆ VSTOXX   -0.001***   -0.001*** 
   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Return exchange rate   -0.223***   -0.156*** 
   (0.035)   (0.042) 
Constant -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 21,395 20,382 20,355 12,547 11,586 11,586 
Number of stocks 16 16 16 15 15 15 
R² 0.000 0.238 0.245 0.000 0.288 0.295 
Prob > F 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Results are obtained by regressing the return of the respective stock on the change in domestic eurozone exit risk 
and a set of control variables using stock fixed effects and robust standard errors (as described in eq. (8)).  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 21: Results for the panel of individual stock returns: Technology 
Technology Full sample Subsample 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
∆ Exit Risk -0.055 0.005 0.003 -0.049 -0.015 -0.023  
(0.047) (0.049) (0.049) (0.104) (0.109) (0.110) 
Return stock market  0.340*** 0.284***  0.318*** 0.265*** 
  (0.039) (0.043)  (0.039) (0.040) 
∆ Sovereign spread  -0.015*** -0.016***  -0.013*** -0.015*** 
  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) 
Return industry index  0.127*** 0.133***  0.142*** 0.145***  
 (0.013) (0.017)  (0.013) (0.018) 
∆ VSTOXX   -0.001***   -0.001*** 
   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Return exchange rate   -0.101***   -0.084* 
   (0.033)   (0.044) 
Constant -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001***  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 20,912 19,956 19,927 11,839 10,928 10,928 
Number of stocks 26 26 26 25 25 25 
R² 0.000 0.092 0.094 0.000 0.111 0.113 
Prob > F 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.65 0.00 0.00 
 
Table 22: Results for the panel of individual Stock returns: Telecommunications 
Telecommunications Full sample Subsample 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
∆ Exit Risk -0.240** -0.188* -0.201** -0.311* -0.278 -0.288*  
(0.066) (0.086) (0.076) (0.137) (0.144) (0.132) 
Return stock market  0.433*** 0.331***  0.433*** 0.326*** 
  (0.048) (0.063)  (0.047) (0.062) 
∆ Sovereign spread  -0.009** -0.010**  -0.007* -0.009** 
  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) 
Return industry index  0.263** 0.355**  0.244** 0.309**  
 (0.073) (0.109)  (0.065) (0.100) 
∆ VSTOXX   -0.001**   -0.001*** 
   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Return exchange rate   -0.307**   -0.230 
   (0.113)   (0.114) 
Constant -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 9,653 9,189 9,179 5,785 5,345 5,351 
Number of stocks 6 6 6 6 6 6 
R² 0.000 0.243 0.251 0.001 0.280 0.288 
Prob > F 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 
Results are obtained by regressing the return of the respective stock on the change in domestic eurozone exit risk 
and a set of control variables using stock fixed effects and robust standard errors (as described in eq. (8)).  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 23: Results for the panel of individual stock returns: Utilities 
Utilities Full sample Subsample 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
∆ Exit Risk -0.043 -0.007 -0.013 -0.098 -0.085 -0.087  
(0.075) (0.079) (0.080) (0.104) (0.108) (0.109) 
Return stock market  0.382*** 0.305***  0.352*** 0.271*** 
  (0.036) (0.039)  (0.040) (0.041) 
∆ Sovereign spread  -0.008*** -0.009***  -0.006*** -0.008*** 
  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) 
Return industry index  0.188*** 0.262***  0.191*** 0.245***  
 (0.018) (0.028)  (0.019) (0.029) 
∆ VSTOXX   -0.001***   -0.001*** 
   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Return exchange rate   -0.267***   -0.236*** 
   (0.034)   (0.038) 
Constant -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000***  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 35,361 33,693 33,646 20,768 19,190 19,190 
Number of stocks 24 24 24 23 23 23 
R² 0.000 0.222 0.229 0.000 0.244 0.253 
Prob > F 0.57 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.00 0.00 
Results are obtained by regressing the return of the respective stock on the change in domestic eurozone exit risk 
and a set of control variables using stock fixed effects and robust standard errors (as described in eq. (8)).  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 24: Results for the cross section of estimated betas of individual stocks: Full sample 
 Full sample   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Tradables  0.081      0.076 
  (0.099)      (0.109) 
Foreign sales/Total sales  0.001     0.001 
   (0.001)     (0.001) 
Total assets/Employees   0.000    0.000 
    (0.000)    (0.000) 
Total debt/Total assets    0.006**   0.005* 
     (0.003)   (0.003) 
Log(total assets)     0.027  0.003 
      (0.021)  (0.024) 
Return on assets      0.002 0.002 
       (0.005) (0.005) 
Constant 0.194 0.239 0.268* 0.056 -0.044 0.270* -0.050 
  (0.152) (0.154) (0.141) (0.143) (0.303) (0.142) (0.309) 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 333 326 331 332 332 332 326 
R² 0.046 0.059 0.044 0.066 0.047 0.044 0.077 
Prob > F 0.06 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Results are obtained by regressing the stock-specific estimated 𝛽𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘,𝑖,𝑗,𝑠 (as obtained from eq. (9)) on 
company-specific variables using country and industry fixed effects and robust standard errors (as described in 
eq. (10)).  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Table 25: Sources and descriptive statistics of company-specific variables 
Variable Worldscope Code Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Tradables (Dummy)18 WC07021 (SIC-code) 0.49 0.50 0 1 
Foreign sales/Total sales (%) WC08731 38.63 32.30 0 105.56 
Total assets/Employees WC08406 890.11 2,727.60 15.25 44,634.63 
Total debt/Total assets (%) WC03255/ WC02999 31.19 16.85 0 76.14 
Log(total assets) WC02999 13.41 2.00 9.28 18.86 
Return on assets (%) WC08326 3.21 6.02 -44.15 33.49 
  
                                                          
18 Dummy variable classifying a company as producing either tradable goods (=1) or nontradable goods (=0). 
Classified according to their two-digit SIC code following Forbes 2002b. 
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